Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang filmed by reporters and delegates after speaking about the Global Security Initiative at the Lanting Forum in Beijing on February 21. Attracting farther countries towards its initiative might be the easy part for China. The challenge is how Beijing presents it to its neighbours. Photo: AP
Opinion
Riaz Khokhar
Riaz Khokhar
China must practise the multilateral security it preaches in its disputed borders and seas
From the South China Sea to Indian border, China’s actions in its backyard are raising eyebrows even as it slams hegemony and calls for a multilateral security order
Instead of imposing its view on the neighbourhood, China should engage in dialogue and diplomacy
The United States has faced criticism for its military interventions and coercive tactics to garner support for the world order it dominates. Nations that oppose the US hegemony risk military and economic repercussions.
China projects an alternative model. It has established itself as a partner mostly with a hands-off approach to others’ domestic politics. Its Global Security Initiative, which opposes military alliances, hegemony and unilateralism, has gained traction in regions in South America, Africa and the Arab world.
Recently, Beijing showed its diplomatic prowess by bringing two Middle Eastern arch-rivals, Saudi Arabia and Iran, to the negotiating table. Its peace plan for the Ukraine-Russia conflict, although not well-received in Western capitals, has been hailed in the Global South.
But the true measure of China’s commitment to multilateralism and an anti-hegemonic approach is in how it resolves its disputes in its neighbourhood.
America sees China as a systemic challenge to the US-led world order. Washington’s anti-China rhetoric has intensified, projecting Beijing as aggressive and suggesting it may use force to retake Taiwan and control disputed regional areas. To counter this, the US has formed defence and logistics pacts with allies such as Japan, the Philippines and Australia, as part of an integrated deterrence strategy.
Indeed, China’s diplomatic, economic and military policies towards Southeast Asian nations, India, Australia and Europe during the Covid-19 pandemic have been seen as assertive, and its “no-limits partnership” with Russia has fuelled a perception that it may be enabling Russian aggression in Ukraine.
Yet Beijing’s position has visibly shifted after global resistance. With Xi Jinping claiming a third term as China’s president, the country’s diplomacy appears to have taken a pacifist turn.
Beijing continues to prioritise investments in military and technological modernisation as well as economic power. It also presents itself as favouring a multilateral security order, opposing unilateralism and hegemony, with a swipe at the American military alliances and sanctions against different states.
China’s peace plan for Ukraine, for example, may continue to win support. Brazilian President Lula da Silva, who is due to meet Xi, has proposed a similar multilateral effort to resolve the Ukraine crisis.
Attracting farther countries towards its multilateral security architecture might be the easy part for China. The challenge is how Beijing presents its security initiative in the South and East China Seas as well as the wider Asia-Pacific, where its territorial claims overlap with those of neighbouring countries.
01:38
Japan approves largest military build-up in decades citing Chinese security threats
Japan approves largest military build-up in decades citing Chinese security threats
Beijing should recognise that Japan’s classification of China as the “greatest strategic challenge” stems from its perception of Chinese military aggression, particularly around the contested Diaoyu Islands that the Japanese call the Senkaku islands – at times, in seeming coordination with Russia.
Incidents such as suspected Chinese spy balloons in Japan’s airspace and the overall ratcheted military temperature around the Taiwan Strait have heightened regional military tensions.
The US leverages this fear to rally support for its anti-China military alliances. Experts suggest the free-trade agreement between Beijing and Tokyo, part of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, could act as a crash barrier. A code of conduct to govern disputed waterways could also stabilise the relationship.
Elsewhere, the US has seized on China’s naval assertiveness to expand the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement with the Philippines, potentially increasing US military bases there from five to nine. But if China responds with a counter-mobilisation of its naval forces or deploys vessels in the disputed Spratly Islands, Manila would only be pushed further into the arms of the US.
03:30
US to gain expanded access to Philippine military bases in bid to counter China
US to gain expanded access to Philippine military bases in bid to counter China
Instead, Beijing should be mindful of public sentiment in the Philippines against foreign security forces and invest in the economic development of the port area. This would increase pressure on Philippine politicians to avoid a military confrontation over Taiwan, especially since Manila has few partners to invest in its port and energy infrastructure.
Other analysts suggest Indonesia and other Southeast Asian countries are not unreceptive to China’s global development and security initiatives. But they are concerned that such initiatives may not prevent Beijing’s unilateral measures and occasional naval aggression in disputed South China Sea areas.
In 2016, an international arbitration tribunal ruled that there was no legal basis for China’s nine-dash line claim. Rival claimant countries expect China to adhere to international rules and norms.
Beijing could agree with Southeast Asian states to conclude the South China Sea code of conduct according to international law and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. It would alleviate their concerns and encourage participation in China’s global security initiative.
Similarly, in South Asia, China faces the challenge of normalising its relationship with India while military forces are deployed in dangerous proximity in disputed border regions. Beijing has struggled to persuade Delhi to halt the border conflict and cooperate over the common issues of the Global South, such as debt distress, climate vulnerability and sustainable economic development.
All told, China’s actions in its backyard are raising eyebrows, and it must adopt a more peaceful and multilateral approach to its disputes. Instead of imposing its view, China should engage in dialogue and prioritise diplomacy and cooperation. By respecting multilateralism, avoiding unilateralism and pursuing peaceful resolutions, China can be seen as a peace-loving nation, unlike the US’ and Russia’s historically hegemonic and provocative roles.
Riaz Khokhar is a policy associate at the Center for Regional and Global Connectivity at Tabadlab, Islamabad
