Donald Trump talks tough on Venezuela, but China, Russia and his own diplomatic isolation tie his hands

If the US wants to help the people suffering under the Maduro dictatorship, it should mend fences with allies its own president has offended, especially in Latin America

Brian P. Klein

Published: 1:00am, 22 Apr 2019

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The US announced enhanced sanctions against Caracas last week targeting Venezuela’s central bank, cutting off its access to the US financial system. The move, intended to further isolate Nicolas Maduro’s regime, comes after months of tough talk to end his grip on power. More sanctions are expected in May to further curtail Venezuela’s trade in oil, their main export and foreign currency earner.

President Donald Trump and his National Security Adviser John Bolton have continued to call for Maduro’s ouster, repeatedly saying that “all options” are on the table. While grandstanding for adoring crowds may be Trump’s speciality, Maduro’s generals and allies have not been moved by the threat of armed conflict, especially Russia and China, who continue to back him despite the increasing risk of defaults on tens of billions of dollars in loans.

Trump has very limited, if any, “hard” military options due to both conditions on the ground and domestic and international political constraints. Invasion, blockade or arming an alternate military force of defectors are extremely unlikely. If the administration is truly interested in supporting Venezuelan democracy, they are going to have to abandon their go-it-alone strategy and build strong alliances to assist in ending Maduro’s destructive rule. That means toning down the warlike rhetoric.

In a reversal of goodwill shown for decades, perceptions of the US among countries around the world have plummeted during Trump’s tumultuous presidency. According to a February 2019 Pew Research Centre report, 45 per cent of nations surveyed regard US power and influence as a “major threat”. The highest percentages, and largest changes in negative sentiment, came from Germany, France, Mexico and Brazil.

Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro welcomes supporters participating in an “anti-imperialist” protest in Caracas on March 23. Photo: EPA-EFE via handout

Trump also targeted major trading partners and allies with unilateral tariffs, including Canada, Mexico, the EU and Japan. Most recently, he’s rescinded aid to Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador over illegal immigration concerns. For the past 2½ years, the White House has done nothing but excoriate Latin America on immigration issues. That’s done little to endear the region to US concerns about democracy in Venezuela.

Any military intervention is complicated by Russia reportedly sending troops and material to help prop up Maduro’s failing government. While their numbers may be small compared to the US Southern Command, their presence hampers potential military options with the threat of direct US-Russian conflict in Latin America.

In addition, there’s been little sign that Maduro’s generals will defect. Hopes rose when Air Force General Francisco Yanez switched his support this past February to Juan Guaidó, the main opposition leader. Since then, there’s been limited signs of military support for the opposition, save for rank-and-file soldiers complaining about harsh economic conditions. Along with Maduro’s political elites, top members of the armed forces remain one of the greatest beneficiaries of government largesse, while the rest of the population struggles to survive. Cuba is also reportedly assisting Maduro as an additional military wing to keep his troops in line.

Even in the US, there’s questionable support for military intervention after decades of conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq. Trump’s “America first” rhetoric is founded on unwinding US involvement overseas, not starting new ones. With the US presidential election cycle about to kick off in earnest, Trump will be preoccupied with campaigning. A controversial military conflict unpopular with his isolationist base would likely drag on his re-election efforts.

While the US has targeted Venezuela’s oil exports, its main source of revenue, the campaign has met with limited success. State-run Venezuelan oil company Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) continues to export 1 million barrels per day.

China, which has lent heavily to Venezuela with oil-backed loans starting in 2007, is still due an estimated US$20 billion. If sanctions curtail oil production, those loans are at increasing risk of default.

The next round of sanctions are expected to target companies and financial institutions involved in the oil trade, cutting them off from the US banking system. That’s significant leverage on Venezuela’s sales of oil. Some countries, including Russia, are willing to barter refined fuel for the oil, subverting the global financial system. There’s little to stop that trade from continuing.

America to the world: do as I say, not as I do

Still, a further tightening of Venezuela’s access to hard currency will have some effect on the economy, but will it be enough to turn the political tide? In principle, the lack of cash should weaken Maduro’s ability to pay his generals, fomenting unrest and eventually leading to defections. That hasn’t worked so well against North Korea. Largely cut off from the international system, the Kim regime is still able to import luxury goods and supply its expanding missile and nuclear arsenal.

On the diplomatic front, 54 countries now recognise Juan Guaidó as the legitimate president of Venezuela, after an election widely considered illegitimate by Western countries. Russia, China, Iran, Syria and Cuba continue to back Maduro.

While the US has tried to engage UN support for new elections, vetoes by Russia and China, permanent members of the Security Council, killed the proposal.

Despite the limited external support for Maduro’s ouster, he still holds onto power. Riots over food, electrical outages and shortages of medicine, along with an inflation rate of over 1 million per cent that forced millions to flee the country, have not been enough to end his reign. The UN expects 5.3 million Venezuelans displaced by the end of 2019, more than one-sixth of the population.

Which leaves the Trump administration with few options.

If the White House wants democracy restored, then threats about military action, which alienate allies, don’t serve that purpose well. Rather, a focus on brightening Venezuela’s future and curbing the plundering of the country’s resources might bring an end to the suffering sooner rather than later.

Brian P. Klein, a former US diplomat, is the founder and CEO of Decision Analytics, a strategic advisory and political risk firm based in New York City

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