China’s authorities can allay Hong Kong’s worst fears by addressing its frustrated democratic dreams

The central government understands the extradition bill triggered widespread anxiety about Hong Kong’s future
While maintaining law and order is the immediate priority, in the long term, a package addressing both universal suffrage and Article 23 could be negotiated

Andrew Leung

Published: 9:00am, 24 Jul 2019

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The night of July 21 will be remembered as the time law and order in Hong Kong broke down. The entire city watched on television as hooligans in white T-shirts attacked people in Yuen Long MTR station, especially targeting black-clad extradition-bill protesters.

A short while earlier, protesters had vandalised China’s national emblem and a plaque outside the liaison office building, where the central government’s top representative in Hong Kong sits. A masked protester announced the setting up of a “temporary legislative council”, alleging the breakdown of the city’s governance. Protesters sprayed slogans such as “liberate Hong Kong” and “revolution of our time” on the walls.

The day before, police discovered a cache of explosives. A person connected with a pro-Hong Kong independence group was among those arrested.

The night’s violence was condemned by Chief Executive Carrie Lam Cheng Yuet-ngor, who pledged that the offenders would be brought to justice. Nevertheless, Lam and her team had a tough time with the press.

The mayhem followed a series of massive public protests that made international headlines. They had an impact on Taiwan’s electoral dynamics and gave the European Union and the United States a convenient stick to beat China with.

While impressively peaceful and well-organised demonstrations are the pride of Hong Kong’s “one country two systems”, it is becoming evident that peaceful protests are being used as cover for a group of well-trained and coordinated militant activists. The pattern has been that after peaceful demonstrations have ended, similarly-dressed radicals move to the front to physically provoke the police and engage in acts of violence calculated to compromise government authority.

These violent acts seem increasingly aimed at eroding confidence in the police and the unity of the force. “Hate-police messages” are shared on social media, children of frontline officers are being targeted at school and police officers posted in hospitals suffered abuse from staff. As frontline police have to bear the brunt of violence head on, they have expressed discontent about their vulnerability.

As the number and geographical spread of protests increase, police resources are becoming stretched. A breakdown of police capacity will make Hong Kong ungovernable.

Police officers in anti-riot gear clash with extradition bill protesters attempting to charge into the Legislative Council Complex in Tamar, Admiralty, on June 12. Photo: Felix Wong

To turn the situation around in the short term, maintenance of law and order must be the top priority. In the medium term, the government must focus on addressing relatively less controversial socio-economic problems such as housing affordability, social security, education and welfare.

Given this, it’s no surprise that Beijing continues to back Lam. There is no tough and experienced administrator who could replace her in sight. Unless she messes up again, or until Beijing finds a markedly better substitute, Lam may be allowed to serve the remainder of her term.

So far, Beijing’s reaction has remained somewhat muted as in-depth assessments are finding their way to President Xi Jinping’s desk. With symbols of governmental authority being vandalised, such as the ransacking of Hong Kong’s Legislative Council chamber, the central government could view the ongoing drama as a plot to ferment a “colour revolution” to destabilise the Hong Kong government and drag China down. In 2015, a People’s Liberation Army general ascribed such a motive to the “Umbrella movement”.

However, it is unlikely that Beijing will brand the whole extradition bill movement this way, having become aware of genuine widespread anxiety about the bill.

Beijing realises that the massive protests reflect not so much anxieties about livelihood issues as frustrated democratic aspirations to maintain Hong Kong’s values and way of life. A way must be found to appease these demons in the interest of long-term stability.

A universal suffrage package more acceptable to Hongkongers appears to be the only solution. There is no reason why Beijing should prefer tightening its grip on Hong Kong rather than allowing it to continue on autopilot to realise its potential under “one country, two systems”.

What is holding Beijing back is the failure to deliver an insurance policy included in the Basic Law – legislation of Article 23 against sedition and subversion.

Politics is the art of the possible. It is possible to combine universal suffrage and Article 23 into an all-or-nothing package deal, to be enacted at the same time. Negotiations can be carried out with all stakeholders, including the people of Hong Kong, political parties and vested interests.

This process is controversial and will take considerable time. In light of the prevailing fractious mood, it may be best to leave it to the beginning of the next administration.

Hong Kong now represents only about 3 per cent of China’s gross domestic product, down from about 20 per cent before the handover. However, this belies its contribution to China’s development trajectory as a beacon of liberty and rule of law under “one country, two systems”. This contribution is likely to remain pivotal for long-term global strategies such as the Belt and Road Initiative and the internationalisation of China’s currency, the renminbi.

Considering these initiatives’ long-term horizon, should the “one country, two systems” model continue to flourish, Beijing may well wish to extend it beyond 2047. If so, a decision will need to be made about 12 years in advance if business confidence is to be maintained. Should a favourable decision come to pass, it would serve to reduce the anxieties of Hong Kong’s young and restless unsure of their political future.

Andrew K.P. Leung is an independent China strategist. Email: [email protected]

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