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Base or no base, Cambodia has warmed to Beijing, much to the chagrin of the Pentagon. Photo: AP
Opinion
Emanuele Scimia
Emanuele Scimia

Cambodia is the US-China rivalry’s latest front, as talk of base access alarms Washington

  • Phnom Penh and Beijing both deny reports of a new base agreement, but undeniably closer cooperation has Washington on edge
  • Ultimately, the growing rivalry between the two and the importance of the Indo-Pacific region means further militarisation appears inevitable
After the ministerial meeting between the United States and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in Bangkok on Thursday, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo welcomed Cambodia’s denial that it was allowing China to build a military installation on its soil.

But speculation is rife about the Chinese getting exclusive access to a naval base in Cambodia for up to 30 years under a secret agreement. If recent reports prove correct, the Chinese will secure a permanent or semi-permanent military foothold in the Gulf of Thailand, on top of their already substantial control over a strategic corridor between the Spratly and Paracel Islands in the South China Sea.

That is not good news for the United States and its partners in Southeast Asia, which dispute China’s historical claims to this vital waterway and are concerned with its growing military prowess.

The two great powers are actually playing a similar game, given that America seeks new overseas military outposts as well. There is a race for “places and bases” in the Indo-Pacific region, and Cambodia is a valuable prize for the Chinese.

Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen and the Chinese leadership denied that the two nations agreed on the expansion of the Ream Naval Base in southern Cambodia. However, the Cambodian government’s decision to back down from revamping such a facility with US support has reportedly aroused suspicion in Washington.

Cambodian soldiers stand at Ream Naval Base in Sihanouk province in July. The Cambodian Ministry of Defence allowed a tour for journalists to visit the base following allegations of Chinese military presence at the facility. Photo: EPA-EFE
In recent months, the US has also raised concerns about possible military use of a deep water port (and an airport) under construction in another Cambodian location, Dara Sakor, where the Chinese have heavily invested in a real estate project.
Privileged access to Cambodian seaports makes perfect sense in strategic terms for China. It could contribute to the “string of pearls”, a network of bases from coastal China to East Africa that would improve the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s ability to project power away from East Asia and protect Chinese trade interests along key shipping routes. Furthermore, it may help China place a perimeter of security around mainland Southeast Asia.

So it would be an important geopolitical development, but likely not a game changer. Unimpeded passage through the Strait of Malacca, a strategic chokepoint where much of China’s energy imports from Africa and the Persian Gulf passes daily, cannot be granted during a crisis by simple “control” of one or more naval bases in Cambodia. The lack of direct seaboard to the Indian Ocean remains a major obstacle to the PLA Navy’s projection outside the China seas and the Western Pacific.

The US is critical of increasingly warm military relations between Beijing and Phnom Penh. In early 2017, Cambodia suspended all military exercises with the US forces while increasing security dialogue with China.

In its recently released first Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, the US Department of Defence said that countries with weak and illiberal governance such as Cambodia were “more susceptible to malign external influence”. The Cambodian constitution does not permit setting up foreign military bases in the country, but constitutional hurdles can be removed.

According to US strategists, China’s creation of “bases or a military presence” on coastal Cambodia would challenge regional security and mark a shift in the Southeast Asian country’s foreign policy. To ease concerns about its military ties with Phnom Penh, Beijing could opt for preferred access to Cambodian ports for warships rather than establishing a permanent base. Access to Cambodian facilities for simple stopovers and technical activities may be less alarming for other regional actors.

Even in such a scenario, however, China could pre-position logistics materiel and assets to train Cambodian armed forces. Ultimately, as the US Pentagon has underscored in its annual report to Congress on China’s military strength, the Chinese may be working on a mix of military logistics models, including “preferred access to overseas commercial ports and a limited number of exclusive PLA logistics facilities”.

Cambodia cooperates with the Chinese under the Belt and Road Initiative, which aims for greater trade and investment links between China and western Europe. The US sees the maritime leg of the belt and road scheme as a Trojan horse to expand the PLA Navy’s use of foreign ports for its logistics needs.
Chinese leaders have always rejected this claim, but do not deny wanting more naval bases abroad – China’s first overseas naval outpost was opened in Djibouti two years ago. In their white paper on national defence strategy, published on July 24, the Chinese admitted that the country “builds far seas forces, [and] develops overseas logistical facilities” to address deficiencies in foreign operations.

China may object that the US is doing the same in the Indo-Pacific area. According to its “expeditionary advanced base operations” concept, the Pentagon plans a more distributed presence of US forces in contested environments so that they can operate not only from primary bases such as those in Japan, South Korea and Guam, but also from “austere” locations.

The US military’s aim is to reduce the enemy’s capacity to neutralise its defences with few strikes. Larger US bases are in fact considered easy targets for Chinese modern missiles. Co-development with Australia of Lombrum naval base on Manus Island, in Papua New Guinea, can be viewed as one of the first attempts to evolve the US military posture in the Indo-Pacific.

Militarisation of Cambodia, Papua New Guinea and other nations in the vast region is likely to be a recurring theme in the regional power play between China and the US.

Emanuele Scimia is an independent journalist and foreign affairs analyst

 

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