Why China’s dreams of global leadership are fading fast

China projects a narrative of being a benevolent and empathetic global leader but, domestically, the narratives coalesce more around nationalist assertions of China as a growing international power
Reconciling this ‘two-level game’ at the heart of its foreign policy is vital

Nicholas Ross Smith

Published: 1:30am, 12 Oct 2020

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Many countries – mostly Western – have overwhelmingly “unfavourable views” of China, according to a Pew Research Centre study released this month. Of the 14 countries surveyed, the percentage of respondents who have “no confidence in Chinese President Xi Jinping to do the right thing regarding world affairs” ranged from 70 per cent in the Netherlands to 84 per cent in Japan. This represents a significant jump from the previous year, where the percentage hovered in the 50-60 range for most countries.

The Pew data is corroborated by another recent study, by the European Council on Foreign Relations, which found that 48 per cent of EU citizens surveyed have a worse view of China since Covid-19. Studies by Gallup, YouGov, and the Institute for Global Change all paint a similar picture: global perceptions of China are increasingly negative.

It is no secret that under Xi’s leadership, China covets a global leadership role. Famously, at the 2017 World Economic Forum in Davos, Xi proclaimed that China would “open our arms to the people of other countries and welcome them aboard the express train of China’s development.” Given that the US under President Donald Trump has apparently abandoned its international role, China’s global leadership aspirations are certainly timely.

Beyond global leadership, China has a more ambitious goal of reshaping the international order. It is clear that Beijing sees the status quo as privileging the US and has, along with Russia, pushed for an international order that is “just and fair”.

Indeed, initiatives such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Belt and Road Initiative have seemingly laid the foundations for a Chinese order that can represent an alternative, or even eventually a rival, to the US-led order.

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However, for China to be capable of reshaping the international order, it needs to have partners that share its vision. International order is built through developing strong friendships with prominent powers that encompass not only strategic and normative alignments but also cultural understanding as well as strong historical foundations.

The problem for China is that, beyond Russia, Pakistan and some quasi-client states in Africa, very few countries seem ready to jump aboard the “express train of China’s development”. The negative state of global perceptions is a significant blow to China’s international aims and desires.

Some of this is beyond China’s control. Its status as a non-Western rising power means that whatever it does, it will be viewed with suspicion by outsiders (especially in the current West-centric order).

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In Australia, for example, fear (some would say paranoia) of China’s rise has been spiralling out of control, leading to a sea change in its foreign policy strategy towards China. Similar trends can be seen in the US and New Zealand.

Although increasing Sinophobia is a popular argument in China for why its international actions are viewed with suspicion, Beijing’s own actions also account for much of the problem.

Last year was disastrous reputationally for China: the world learned more about the re-education camps in Xinjiang, for example, while issues such as the Hong Kong protests and the coercive use of Chinese market power came to the fore. But the Covid-19 pandemic gave China something of a clean slate.

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Initially, China’s “mask diplomacy” seemed to strike a chord, particularly in Italy, Spain and Serbia. It looked like China was stepping up as a global leader and helping countries when the European Union and the US were failing to do so.

It led to moments such as Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic publicly kissing the Chinese flag, and people in Rome singing thanks to China from their balconies during lockdowns.

But, China’s mask diplomacy soon started to unravel. Issues with the quality of supplies blighted Beijing’s efforts as well as accusations that it was selling to the highest bidder rather than following a purely humanitarian approach. China’s heavy-handed tactics in dealing with recipient countries also left a sour taste.

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While China’s inability to use the pandemic as a springboard to stake its claim for global leadership is partly down to a lack of international credibility, it also helps to illustrate China’s challenge in navigating the “two-level game” at the heart of its foreign policy.

According to American political scientist Robert Putnam, a state must balance the game it plays with its population (that is, domestic politics) and the game it plays with other countries (international interactions).

For China, there appears to be a sizeable disconnect between its domestic and international games. China projects a narrative of being a benevolent and empathetic global leader but, domestically, the narratives coalesce more around nationalist assertions of China as a growing international power.

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One example of how China’s domestic pressures can negatively affect its reputation is the phenomenon of “hurt feelings”: the Chinese public’s inclination for a knee-jerk outcry against perceived foreign transgressions.

This was evident in last year’s NBA fiasco, when the Houston Rockets’ general manager tweeted support for Hong Kong protesters, which led to widespread condemnation and the boycotting of the NBA in China, broadcasting the “hurt feelings” phenomenon to a new audience – Western sports fans.

Ultimately, if China wants to reinvigorate its push for global leadership, it needs international partners that share its vision of international politics and order. But winning over international audiences and elites is only one of the challenges – convincing its domestic audience is just as important.

Until China can bridge its international and domestic games, any aspirations of global leadership will continue to falter.

Nicholas Ross Smith is an associate professor of international studies at University of Nottingham Ningbo China