China needs better friends than the Taliban to make the most of its rise to power
If China is to challenge the US-led order, it has to be able to forge friendships with more powerful countries that share its vision of international politics
China can find common ground to build relationships, but it struggles to generate the critical mass needed to turn them into friendships that matter
As the United States withdrawal from Afghanistan reaches the eleventh hour, the return of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan seems a mere formality. Given that the Taliban was ostensibly the reason the US undertook the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the rapid return of the group to power in Kabul does not bode well for US-Afghan relations or US interests in the region.
China, on the other hand, potentially stands to benefit if the Taliban returns to power. Taliban spokesman Suhail Shaheen recently called China a “welcome friend” and promised to protect Chinese investors and workers in Afghanistan as well as stop any potential Uygur separatist fighters from using Afghanistan as a safe haven.
Geopolitically, this is a potentially significant development for China. Afghanistan – which shares a border with China – sits in a region of immense importance to China’s global ambitions. The most notable of these is China’s flagship policy, the Belt and Road Initiative, with the main “road” running directly through Central Asia.
China has already invested significant amounts in the broader region, especially in Pakistan with its China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which began in 2013. Having a friendly Afghanistan could see it expand its infrastructure projects farther north.
Afghanistan, under Taliban rule, could join Pakistan in giving Beijing two “ironclad friends” in Central Asia at a time when Sino-Iranian relations appear robust. That would undermine the influence of the US and India there.
04:41
Taliban eyes victory as US forces and allies withdraw from Afghanistan
Taliban eyes victory as US forces and allies withdraw from Afghanistan
Pakistan is an interesting template to consider as the friendship it shares with Beijing is more than a strategic and normative arrangement; it is also rooted in significant historical reciprocity. China was instrumental in helping Pakistan acquire nuclear weapons and, more recently, it has supported Pakistan over the Kashmir issue.
Pakistan, in return, supported China after the Tiananmen Square crackdown while, more recently, it has been an outspoken defender of China’s Xinjiang policies. The Sino-Pakistan friendship matters to both sides and significant trust has been built through the years.
The Taliban’s friendly overtures to Beijing have not gone unnoticed in China. Global Times editor Hu Xijin welcomed the news in a Weibo post, stating it demonstrated “how powerful and mature Chinese diplomacy is”.
However, while the potential for a friendship to blossom between a Taliban-led Afghanistan and China could be cause for celebration at the regional level, it should not be treated as a sign that China can forge friendships that will reconstruct international politics and order.
When considered within a wider lens, China’s efforts to forge friendships across the globe – something President Xi Jinping has long stressed as being a crucial aspect of international relations – has been a mixed bag so far. Besides arguably its best friend Pakistan, the list of Beijing’s true friends includes Zambia, Zimbabwe, North Korea, Serbia and Cambodia.
These are not the kind of friends that will help China capitalise on its international rise. If China is to emerge as a challenger to the US-led international order, it has to be able to forge friendships with more powerful countries – ones that share and can reinforce its vision of international politics.
Russia is potentially one such country, one with which Beijing has grown much closer in recent years. Beyond that, though, perceptions of China have never been lower across the globe, especially in the West.
The past 12 months have been particularly bad for China’s efforts to forge friendships. First, there was its inability to effectively undertake “mask diplomacy” as its claims of humanitarianism and brotherly love were undercut by shoddy equipment and false promises.
Second, there was the growth of “wolf warrior” behaviour by Chinese diplomats abroad and the continued inability to build soft power. Third, China’s obfuscation of details about the Covid-19 outbreak in Wuhan has led to the rise of the lab leak theory, which only adds to worsening external perceptions.
05:08
Nature or lab leak? Why tracing the origin of Covid-19 matters
Nature or lab leak? Why tracing the origin of Covid-19 matters
China has invested a lot of time and money in trying to present itself to the rest of the world as a good global citizen, one which is ready to step up as an international leader in a time of international economic and political turmoil. However, few beyond the Taliban are looking to China for leadership at the moment.
China’s foreign policy is somewhat undermined by the domestic situation in China. As China celebrates 100 years of the Communist Party and it looks forward to the next pivotal date of 2049 – 100 years of Communist Party rule – much of the popular legitimacy of the party’s governance rests on its promise to protect China from humiliation and subjugation by foreign powers and to complete the country’s rejuvenation.
As Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokeswoman Hua Chunying said shortly after the Alaska summit in March and in response to global condemnation of China’s Xinjiang policies, “China is not the China of 120 years ago”. This is a clear signal, both internally and externally, that China can no longer be bullied by outsiders.
A domestic manifestation of this kind of top-down identity discourse is that the Chinese public is often prone to the phenomenon of “hurt feelings” – a knee-jerk popular reaction to perceived slights by outsiders. Recent examples of the Chinese people’s feelings being hurt include Houston Rockets general manager Daryl Morey’s comments in support of Hong Kong protesters and actions taken by Swedish fashion giant H&M over reports of forced labour in Xinjiang – both of which resulted in massive boycotts.
The problem with a domestic situation like this is that it prevents China from building the kind of intercultural understanding and appreciation that deep friendships between states generally need – just think of South Korea’s impressive cultural outreach.
China has no problems finding common strategic and normative grounds to build relationships, but it struggles to generate the critical mass needed to turn its putative friendships into friendships that matter for international politics.
Thus, despite wanting deeper friendships, China continues to appeal only to roguish outfits such as the Taliban and not the people or states it needs to court. Because of this, China is likely to remain something of a lonely power and unable to fully translate its ongoing rise into international political capital.
Nicholas Ross Smith is an associate professor of international studies at the University of Nottingham Ningbo China
