The Ukraine-Russia crisis is no longer the US’ problem in a world of rising regional powers

While US-Russia talks may ease fears of a Russian invasion of Ukraine, the two sides fundamentally disagree on how security should be managed in the region
As the world moves away from a US-dominated power structure, perhaps Washington should step back and let Europe take care of itself

Nicholas Ross Smith

Published: 1:30am, 7 Jan 2022

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The US and Russia have entered 2022 with an apparent desire to find common ground over Ukraine. Not only did US President Joe Biden and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin have a lengthy phone call on December 30, it was also announced that the two sides will hold talks in Geneva on January 10.

These are positive signs, given the fear surrounding Russia’s intensions in Ukraine, particularly after it amassed some 100,000 troops on the Ukrainian border. While this might just be periodic sabre rattling, an intervention by Russia cannot be ruled out (Moscow was brazen enough to annex Crimea, after all).

However, like previous talks and initiatives, a lasting agreement is unlikely to be reached in 2022 because the underlying issue – the lack of an agreed Eastern European security architecture – remains a point of significant discord.

Crudely, a security architecture is “a system of norms, practices, relationships, alliances and institutions constructed or developed by nations to address, enhance or ensure international and/or regional security”. In other words, it is an arrangement on how the security of a particular region should be managed.

The main Western players in this security dilemma – the US and EU – see Eastern Europe as a region for Western engagement. Indeed, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the European Union and Nato expanded eastward and created something of a material and ideological hegemony in the region (with Russia and Belarus defiant resisters).

Conversely, for Russia, Eastern Europe is a highly sensitive security setting which cannot be dominated by the West. It sees the area as not only geographically close to Moscow but is also culturally, linguistically and historically linked to the Russian civilisation.

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Russian troops massing near Ukraine’s eastern border sparks invasion fear

Ukraine, for what it is worth, tends to agree with the Western viewpoint and believes it should be free to chart its own course – most notably pursuing membership in the EU and Nato. However, Russia has punished it continually for this and, in doing so, has shown that it is prepared to pay a higher cost than either the US or EU.

Importantly, the conflict in Ukraine symbolises a key change in international politics. While the US remains the world’s pre-eminent power, the rise of China and India, coupled with the resurgence of Russia and the evolution of the EU, means the international system is transitioning from one of unquestioned US dominance to something closer to a “uni-multipolar system”.

This is one in which the US remains the top dog, but other players are more influential than previously.

While the Cold War has become a popular analogy to forecast the global implications of US-China tensions, the contemporary uni-multipolar system is quite different to the bipolar system that sparked the original Cold War.

This time, there will be no bipolar global contest for supremacy but, rather, localised contests for influence between the US and different regional powers.

Eastern Europe, with Ukraine as the epicentre, is one notable flashpoint due to Russia’s revisionist aims there. The various regions of the Indo-Pacific super-region are other (potential) flashpoints.

Members of the Ukrainian army reserves take part in a military exercise near Kyiv on December 25. Dozens of civilians have enlisted in recent months amid fears that Russia is plotting an attack. Photo: AFP

Indeed, given the greater geopolitical and geoeconomic importance of the Indo-Pacific to the US compared to Eastern Europe, it is unsurprising that it has tried to “pivot to Asia”. But, the antics of Putin and the Europeans’ seeming lack of readiness to manage their own security has kept the US firmly involved.

Unsurprisingly, Washington has censured Europe for its lack of defence spending, while the EU has proven time and again that it is an ineffective international actor – the joke is that, in times of crisis, all the EU can do is express how “concerned” it is.

Yet, Europe should not be the US’ problem and its continued presence there is not only somewhat paternalistic (which creates dependence), it also distorts the power dynamics of greater Europe, making Eastern Europe an unstable corridor.

The potential for Europe to develop its own strategic autonomy should not be dismissed as a pipe dream. French President Emmanuel Macron has spoken of a desire for an EU army and even of pursuing rapprochement with Russia.

New Chancellor of Germany Olaf Scholz (left) with French President Emmanuel Macron in Paris on December 10. Photo: EPA-EFE

If the new German Chancellor, Olaf Scholz, agrees with Macron, there would be the impetus for Europe to seek greater security and defence integration.

Ultimately, Washington should encourage such a move. However, it seems the US has not moved on from its “unipolar moment” and still believes it needs to be at the forefront of global security challenges – a kind of strategic narcissism.

Certainly, belligerent revisionists like Russia deserve blame and criticism for pursuing zero-sum regional policies which threaten smaller countries. But the sad truth for Ukraine is that the US is not prepared to pay the same price when tensions turn to violence.

In fact, half-hearted US support in distant countries – evidenced by Ukraine – ultimately breeds more insecurity than security.

Thus, the US needs to find pragmatic ways of balancing the growing demands of revisionists like Russia with its own (evolving) interests, rather than blindly attempting to maintain the status quo. It is not only in its long-term interest, but also in the interests of most parties involved in such regional dilemmas.

Nicholas Ross Smith is an adjunct fellow at the University of Canterbury, New Zealand