Finland model offers pragmatic way forward for Ukraine and Russia on Nato and EU

It looks increasingly unlikely that Russia and Ukraine will get everything they want out of negotiations
Instead of a forced neutrality along the lines of Finlandisation, current-day Finland, which maintains neutrality while being a European Union member, offers an example to follow

Nicholas Ross Smith

Published: 10:15am, 10 Mar 2022

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Before Russia declared war on Ukraine, one frequently mentioned solution to the question of Ukraine’s troubled position between West and East was adopting something akin to what Finland adopted during the Cold War.

Under the leadership of its prime minister Juho Kusti Paasikivi, Finland signed an agreement with the Soviet Union that, among other things, recognised Finnish neutrality in the context of great-power conflict and that Finland could not adopt foreign policies contrary to the interests of the Soviet Union. The reward for these concessions was that Finland could remain politically and economically free.

Finlandisation, as this strategy became known, achieved Paasikivi’s main goal of ensuring Finland remained nominally independent, although not to the same level as, say, Yugoslavia. Despite the shadow of the Soviet Union causing significant self-censorship, Finland flourished both politically and economically.

Even so, the period of Finlandisation is a sensitive topic for the Finns and many in and outside Finland view it as a sad capitulation. Finlandisation is certainly a gamble that gives up agency in return for promised stability, and such stability is still heavily contingent on the greater power being credible in its promises.

Understandably, no Ukrainians will find Russia a credible partner any more. The idea of subjugating themselves to a kind of neutrality under the shadow of Russia will be anathema to them.

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The sad truth is that Russia is not likely to go away, despite the popularity of the idea that a “palace coup” could be on the cards. Yes, Russia has taken significant losses so far in this conflict, and the response from the rest of the world has been much stronger and more united than anyone could have imagined.

However, Russia has made it clear that it views Ukraine as a vital national interest and is willing to incur incredible costs to pursue its interests. One should not underestimate Russia’s capacity to suffer. Consequently, Ukraine and the West will have to accommodate Russia’s perspective in any post-conflict settlement.

There are many potential options. Beyond annihilation and being subsumed into a new Russian empire, the most worrying outcome for Ukraine is likely the installation of a loyal regime in Kyiv by the Russians along with a permanent Russian military presence in the country.

Such a scenario could also see large swathes of Ukraine being incorporated into the Russian Federation just like Crimea. Ukraine would be to Russia as Manchukuo was to imperial Japan.

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At the start of the war, there was the fear Ukraine would be quickly overcome by Russian forces. This led to the most likely optimal outcome being a kind of forced neutrality, perhaps along the lines of the Finlandisation proposal.

Ukraine would nominally exist as an independent country, but it would be forced to reject any sort of integration with the West. It would be left a buffer state, isolated and stuck in the shadow of its adversarial neighbour.

However, given the impressive resistance of Ukraine and the stronger-than-expected Western response to the war, a more optimal outcome might be possible. It could be one that gives Ukraine the best future but also satisfies Russia’s security concerns.

The most appropriate analogue for this kind of settlement is still Finland. Rather than the Finland of the Cold War, though, look at present-day Finland.

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As has become apparent recently, the Kremlin still sees Finland as geopolitically sensitive. Finland’s public statements about considering joining Nato elicited a reply from Russia that joining the transatlantic alliance would be met with “military and political consequences”.

Finland is still likely to remain neutral, but it is in a far more advantageous position than it was in the Cold War. It is now a full member of the European Union and benefits greatly from this economic and political integration. Until the recent verbal skirmishes with the Kremlin, Russia has been a relative non-factor in its day-to-day existence.

The prospect of Ukraine being an EU member seemed like a fairy tale a few weeks ago. Despite the EU’s increased interaction with Ukraine, membership was always ruled out.

Just ask many of the countries of the western Balkans or Turkey. Joining the EU not only requires a litany of political, economic and legal reforms, but it is also highly politically charged.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen delivers a statement before a meeting at the Berlaymont Building in Brussels on March 7. Photo: AFP

Yet, Ukraine’s membership prospects to the EU seemingly changed overnight. The European Commission president, Ursula von der Leyen, said after Russia’s invasion that “Ukraine is one of us and we want them in the EU”.

Since then, Zelensky has officially requested a special membership pathway for Ukraine. Although this is unlikely to be granted, Ukraine’s EU future is closer than being a reality than ever before.

Getting Russia to accept Ukraine’s membership in the EU in a post-conflict scenario is likely to be a hard sell, especially as the original crisis arose in part because Russia feared Ukraine’s mere association with the EU.

However, Russian President Vladimir Putin might be forced to accept he will not get everything he wants out of invading Ukraine. As issues at home are likely to increase in the wake of the West’s financial response, perhaps a bargain could be found.

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Russia letting Ukraine join the EU could be offset by Nato’s concession that Ukraine can never join it and Ukraine’s concession that it recognises the independence of Luhansk and Donetsk. Perhaps Russia would also demand further concessions such as the removal of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and recognition of Russia’s further territorial gains in the south.

This would be a bitter pill for Ukraine to swallow, but it would make sense if EU membership was the prize for such sacrifices. We have seen in recent weeks that power still dictates international relations, and recognising there is no scenario where Ukraine gets everything it wants is a necessary step to finding a pragmatic solution.

Nicholas Ross Smith is an adjunct fellow at the University of Canterbury, New Zealand