Furore over Pacific nations’ China deals puts focus on security instead of climate change

The reaction to Pacific nations seeking deals with China has been one of fear as Australia and New Zealand act out of national security concerns
But with their paternalistic overtones, Australia and New Zealand run the risk of denying the agency of Pacific countries and ignoring their key concerns

Nicholas Ross SmithandHenrietta McNeill

Published: 1:00am, 2 Jun 2022

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Australia and New Zealand have been swept by consternation after it emerged that China was in discussions towards a potential Pacific-wide pact which could see it cooperate with 10 Pacific island states on issues such as policing, security and data communications. This revelation comes hot on the heels of China agreeing a bilateral security pact with the Solomon Islands.

So far, the substance of the pact has taken a back seat to conjecture. The leaked documents are vaguely written, full of buzzwords and mainly mention police training and maritime mapping.

While the policing aspect might naturally cause alarm, these agreements are complex and more reactive than being part of a grand strategy of establishing spheres of influence abroad. Importantly, there is no mention of military bases. Furthermore, these documents are drafts and remain open to negotiation. To this end, the region-wide agreement appears to have been shelved, although many of the states are continuing bilateral discussions with China.

The response so far, especially in Australia, has been somewhat melodramatic. Fear and urgency, particularly among the Australian commentariat, seem to be the default emotions.

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China’s latest moves have confirmed what was already the default position for Australia – China’s rise is becoming a national security threat that requires a strong response in conjunction with the United States. One commentator, Fergus Hanson, wrote that Australia should team up with the United States and impose a Monroe Doctrine-style sphere of influence in the South Pacific.

This kind of “strategic denial” has long dominated Australian views of the Pacific. Such ideas highlight a tendency to neglect the Pacific islands until national interests are piqued and dismiss Pacific states’ own security priorities, such as climate change. Notably, climate change was the first issue raised by Pacific Islands Forum Secretary General Henry Puna when Foreign Minister Wang Yi recently visited Suva.

In New Zealand, the response has been more measured. New Zealand’s relationship with China has blossomed in the past decade, becoming what both sides have termed a “mature” relationship. However, the discourse in New Zealand – which has typically focused more on the positives of trade – is shifting towards viewing China in a more adversarial light, particularly in the Pacific.

Winston Peters, New Zealand’s former minister of foreign affairs, has said “you can’t let a vacuum develop because a vacuum will be soon filled and is being filled now [by China]” and that New Zealand needed to remember that “our home is the Pacific”.

The fact is that China is a rising superpower. Like other rising superpowers in the past, the larger it gets the more influential it will want to become, especially in peripheral regions. Revisionism is a natural by-product of such a fundamental power shift.

There are legitimate concerns about China’s ability to capture elites in these countries and the potential for debt-trap situations. However, many of the touted ideas for how Australia or New Zealand should respond are more based on fear than the reality of these agreements or the domestic political tensions that have spurred Pacific interest in China.

As Joanne Wallis and Maima Koro argue, amplifying the “China threat” narrative in the Pacific might actually help China. In projecting paternalistic visions of their role in the Pacific, traditional partners such as Australia and New Zealand not only run the risk of denying the sovereignty and agency of these countries but also are in peril of losing influence themselves.

The response to the Solomon Islands’ decision to sign the security agreement with China shows this. Pacific leaders including Solomon Islands Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare have reacted strongly to the use of the word “backyard”, which both Australia and New Zealand have used in reference to the Pacific.

Fijian Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama reiterated that “Fiji is not anyone’s backyard – we are part of a Pacific family” when meeting new Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong. Language like “backyard” is tantamount to a kind of neocolonialism in the Pacific. It also supports China’s allegations of Western states maintaining a “colonial mentality”.

Furthermore, embracing a one-size-fits-all approach to the region belies the political diversity of the Pacific. In the last 10 days, we have seen this political diversity on display.

While the Federated States of Micronesia has encouraged Pacific states not to sign the “predetermined joint communique” with China, Samoa has signed three agreements with China, including to develop a policing academy. Kiribati has signed 10 agreements, including on fisheries, with China but avoided a security deal, and Fiji has joined the newly launched Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity and also held meetings with Wang.

The multitude of geopolitical options mean that nothing should be taken for granted. Pacific states know that when there is competition, they can benefit from the increased interest.

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For instance, the Solomon Islands saw several new offers suddenly on the table from traditional donors as soon as the draft security pact was leaked. Playing donors off against one another is a tool long used by smaller states to try to improve their situation.

If the war in Ukraine has demonstrated anything, it is an ever-increasing divide between the West and the rest of the world in terms of the vision for international relations. Countries from the Global South do not pine for deliverance by the West, and the same is true in the Pacific with regard to the roles of Australia and New Zealand.

Ultimately, if traditional partners such as Australia and New Zealand wish to retain influence, they should listen to Pacific states rather than assuming or even demanding that their interests take precedence. As Tuvaluan Foreign Minister Simon Kofe said recently, geopolitical competition is taking the attention of Pacific states and their partners away from the single greatest Pacific security concern – climate change.

Nicholas Ross Smith is an adjunct fellow at the University of Canterbury, New Zealand

Henrietta McNeill is a PhD candidate in the Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs at the Australian National University