Why China’s ‘zero-Covid’ upheaval holds both promise and peril for the country’s future

The good news for the Chinese people is that the recent protests were dispersed with little bloodshed and the end of pandemic restrictions is finally in sight
The bad news is the public’s rejection of Covid-19 rules raises the political stakes of the next controversial policy and could threaten regime legitimacy

Nancy Qian

Published: 4:20pm, 11 Dec 2022

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China’s leaders always knew they would have to abandon their “zero-Covid” policy eventually and, the longer they waited, the more painful the transition would be. Yet, they seemed mired in the policy, unable to leave it behind and move on.

Then, a blaze in a block of flats in locked-down Xinjiang killed 10 people, whose escape was thwarted by locked doors and blocked entrances. This sparked China’s largest anti-government protests since the Tiananmen movement of 1989 and became the catalyst for the authorities’ decision to begin easing restrictions.

The protests were an expression of the frustration and anger accumulated during nearly three years of aggressive lockdowns, with families stuck in their homes for months, unable to visit dying loved ones, access regular healthcare or even buy food.

Compared to 1989, the government’s response was rather moderate: police dispersed demonstrations with relatively little violence, though this partly reflected their ability to use new surveillance technologies to track down protesters. China’s government has also apparently listened to the protesters. It has now scrapped some of its harsher pandemic policies, such as the requirement to quarantine in state facilities.

But the path out of zero Covid will be long and difficult, and not only from a health perspective. The recent upheaval points to broader political challenges in the years to come.

The plan for exiting zero Covid has been known to Chinese leaders for some time. They must boost the population’s immunity – especially that of the elderly – through some combination of higher vaccination rates and more effective foreign vaccines. Otherwise, epidemiologists estimate that opening up could cause 1 million to 2 million Covid deaths.

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For a population of 1.4 billion people, even 2 million deaths would amount to a much lower mortality rate than in the United States. But, after years spent suffering under strict lockdowns as the government touted its zero-Covid credentials, the people are unlikely to find this distinction comforting.

China has attempted to ease its pandemic restrictions before, only to tighten them when cases surged. This pattern is likely to continue until enough of the elderly are vaccinated and both the government and public accept the increased risk of infection and death. In this sense, China will follow the unsteady path to a post-pandemic “normal” other countries have taken.

What sets China apart are the political stakes. Zero Covid was the subject of a power struggle which played out largely behind closed doors between President Xi Jinping, who was committed to the hardline approach, and moderates such as Prime Minister Li Keqiang, who advocated less-stringent rules for the sake of economic growth.

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Xi won. China maintained zero Covid, he was appointed to an unprecedented third term as the Communist Party’s general secretary and the leadership of the Politburo Standing Committee, including Li, was replaced with his loyalists. Notably, in his moment of political victory at the 20th party congress in October, Xi re-emphasised the importance of zero Covid. Abandoning the policy less than two months later is a blow to his credibility.

But this is not about one man. The zero-Covid drama could threaten the legitimacy of the Chinese government. This is because Chinese autocracy masks systemic instability.

When citizens of democracies are dissatisfied with their politicians’ performance, they vote them out of office. The change in leadership does not destabilise the system because elections are part of the political framework. But China lacks a formal mechanism for citizens to meaningfully affect policy, so unhappy citizens must resort to “illegal” forms of expression such as protests.

Since these activities are outside the rules, they erode the country’s institutional structure. Moreover, in a one-party system, a protest against government policy amounts to a protest against the party and the regime. This is especially true today because Xi has consolidated his hold on power by concentrating it in his own hands.

In today’s China, disagreeing with any government policy is tantamount to disagreeing with Xi and, thus, the Communist Party. This creates a dilemma for moderate figures. If they disagree with the official government position on an issue, they must choose between challenging it and defending the party’s legitimacy and the regime’s stability.

As for the protests, the government will undoubtedly adopt measures to prevent them from recurring. Before the pandemic, protests in Chinese cities were often followed by investment in police surveillance and a decline in popular resistance. This time is unlikely to be different.

The party does not want its capitulation on zero Covid to encourage people to take to the streets whenever they disagree with a policy decision. Even as the government eases pandemic restrictions, it will tighten further control over the public sphere.

Recent developments thus bring mixed tidings for the Chinese people. Optimists can say the end of zero Covid is finally in sight, the government responded to the demands of the people and the protests were dispersed with little bloodshed.

Pessimists, meanwhile, will point to the public’s rejection of the government’s Covid rules, note how it raises the political stakes of the next controversial policy and predict that the coming years are likely to bring ever tighter control amid rising instability.

Nancy Qian, professor of managerial economics and decision sciences at Northwestern University’s Kellogg School of Management, is a co-director of Northwestern University’s Global Poverty Research Lab and the founding director of China Econ Lab. Copyright: Project Syndicate