US military support for Philippines in the South China Sea is no sure thing

US officials have pledged military support in case of a Chinese attack on the Philippines, but the treaty leaves some room for interpretation
There are many factors that could influence a US decision to support the Philippines, including the consequences of risking a military clash with China

Mark J. Valencia

Published: 1:00am, 16 Dec 2022

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“An armed attack on the Philippines armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the South China Sea would invoke US mutual defence commitments.” With such supportive statements, US Vice-President Kamala Harris reinforced the notion that, under their mutual defence treaty, the United States would provide military support to the Philippines in the event of aggression by China in the South China Sea, but such military backup is neither automatic nor guaranteed.

Article I of the treaty says that each party is to “refrain in their international relations from the use of force”.

Article IV states that “an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations”.

Article V defines the meaning of “attack” as “an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of either of the parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific Ocean, its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific”. Both Harris and former US secretary of state Mike Pompeo confirmed that “Pacific” includes the South China Sea.

A common assumption is that a clash between Chinese and Philippine forces there would invoke the mutual defence treaty. But one possible interpretation of the treaty’s language is that the Philippines must not be the first to use armed force and thus must be the victim of an unprovoked attack. This could be unlikely as China is increasing its use of “grey zone” assets to accomplish its goals while avoiding a US military response.

The US military did not come to the rescue when in March 2011 Chinese patrol boats harassed Philippines-authorised exploration on the Reed Bank. Perhaps it did not qualify as an armed attack on Philippine forces.

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In an April 2012 incident at the Scarborough Shoal, which both the Philippines and China claim, the US military did not come to the Philippines’ aid. When a Philippine Navy surveillance plane observed Chinese fishing vessels in the shoal, the Philippines sent a warship to inspect their catch. The crew discovered an illegal catch and attempted to arrest the Chinese fishermen, but they were blocked by Chinese maritime surveillance ships and a stand-off ensued.

Eventually, the US brokered a solution in which both sides would withdraw. The Philippines naval vessel did so but the Chinese government vessels did not, and China remains in control of Scarborough Shoal. So if the Philippines is the first to threaten or use military force, an incident might not activate the mutual defence treaty.

The US military did not intervene in November 2021 when Chinese coastguard vessels fired water cannons to block Philippines civilian boats from delivering supplies to the Philippines-occupied Second Thomas Shoal. Perhaps that is because the Philippines vessels were civilian and China did not use armed force.

Even while Harris was on her way to Manila, the Philippines accused the Chinese coastguard of forcibly preventing a Philippine civilian boat from recovering debris from a Chinese rocket near the Spratly Islands. The problems here were the Philippines’ use of a civilian vessel, China’s lack of armed force and its claim to the nearest feature (Pag-asa) and thus its territorial waters.

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Even if there is a clear-cut attack by China’s military on Philippine forces, US military intervention is no sure thing. The Philippines must officially invoke the mutual defence treaty, and there could be considerable backroom negotiations with the US whether it should do so.

Also, the mutual defence treaty says an attack on either party will be acted upon “in accordance with its constitutional processes”. Such processes could create delays and eventually result in a non-military response such as sanctions. The US president could order the use of military force, but could also use this clause as an excuse to avoid doing so.

Manila Times columnist Rigoberto Tiglao argues that the US is saying “other than an outright armed attack on our occupied islands in the Spratlys or on our forces – which is very unlikely in this day and age – they [the US] cannot interfere in our territorial disputes”.

Officially, the US is neutral regarding these territorial disputes.

The point is that politicians’ pledges to defend the Philippines in the South China Sea are not as ironclad as some Filipinos think. The strength of US military support for the Philippines might depend logistically or politically in part on its degree of access to military sites under the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement. The reality is that there are many factors that could influence a US decision to do so, including the consequences of risking a military clash with China.

A failure to do so in a clear situation requiring the US to intervene militarily would damage US credibility and erode its soft power in the region. But nations act in their own self-interest.

The US could determine that avoiding a damaging clash with China is in its long-term interest as well as that of the region. The leadership of the Philippines needs to be realistic and not make dangerous false assumptions.

Mark J. Valencia is a maritime policy analyst in Hawaii