Germany’s U-turn on tanks comes just in time for Ukraine, but much too late for Nato allies

Germany’s leader Olaf Scholz has long resisted calls for the country to provide Ukraine with more military support, citing the risk of escalation
An about-face was inevitable given the hollowness of this excuse, but the delay has hurt Scholz’s leadership and Germany’s reputation

Thomas O. Falk

Published: 3:30am, 31 Jan 2023

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After months of reluctance, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz finally agreed to send Leopard 2 battle tanks to Ukraine. While the decision will change the war’s trajectory, the damage for Germany has already been done. Once again, Berlin has shown that the gap between aspirations and reality for European leadership has yet to be bridged.

The war in Ukraine has been raging for almost a year. In the ever-changing environment, one constant has prevailed: Germany’s presence as an albatross around the Western alliance’s neck over whether Ukraine should be provided with the best possible opportunity to withstand and, ideally, win against Russia.

The irony is palpable. Germany has been outsourcing its own security to Washington for decades. The fact that the last defence minister with any prior experience on the matter was in office in the 1980s only underscores this argument.

With Germany supposed to contribute to Ukraine beyond humanitarian efforts, Scholz made it unequivocally clear that solidarity, in the end, is a one-way street. The risk of “escalation” was the excuse he used most.

However, it was never a plausible motive. Thus far, Putin has not waited for the West to escalate. His aggression, the bombing of civilian targets, and the butcherings in Bucha are exhibits a, b, and c.

Conversations about increased help for Ukraine in Berlin, Washington or Paris were never the reason for these atrocities. Those who negate this reality are not only scaremongering but useful for Russian propagandists.

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz arrives the German parliament in Berlin on January 25. Photo: EPA-EFE

Moreover, extensive deliveries of weapons have already been made. Somehow self-propelled howitzers, anti-aircraft tanks and air defence systems are acceptable, but tanks are the red line the West should not have crossed? It is an argument that never withstood the test of common sense.

At this stage, Moscow can ill-afford any serious escalations. To put it mildly, the course of the war for Russia has been suboptimal. Extending it and, in a worst-case scenario, drawing even more parties into the war does not appear to be in Moscow’s best interest.

Perhaps even more importantly for Putin, China and President Xi Jinping have repeatedly told him that an escalation with the West must not occur under any circumstances, and it seems unlikely that the latter would commit to an agenda resulting in losing Beijing’s friendship.

But actions – or lack thereof – have consequences. Each German ally will now reassess its cooperation, including Washington. Berlin may think it is surrounded by friends, but doubters from Paris to Warsaw have only increased in recent months, and Germany has now shown that in times of war, it is not willing or capable of acting as Europe’s primus inter pares.

The decision now to supply tanks will not undo this damage. Everyone involved understands that Scholz, in the end, had no choice. If he had his way, Germany would probably still be sending helmets as its share of the war effort.

A demonstrator holds a sign reading “free Leopards now!” during a march in Hamburg to demand the delivery of Leopard battle tanks to Ukraine, on January 22. Photo: dpa

A continuation of his stoic reluctance could even have led to the end of his government. His coalition partners, the Greens and the Liberal Democrats, had started to openly call him out after having demanded for months that he live up to his “Zeitenwende” promise, well aware that Scholz’s silence on the tank question isolated Germany in Nato and cost more innocent Ukrainian lives.

Moreover, with Poland officially requesting that Germany agree to them sending tanks (made in Germany) to Ukraine and US President Joe Biden declaring he would deploy US tanks, Scholz’s room for manoeuvre quickly evaporated.

That it took such a united domestic and global effort to pressure him into submission is a tragedy for Nato. One must not forget the Western defence alliance is not supplying Ukraine out of the goodness of its heart. Security concerns have always played a profound role.

Putin sees himself not merely in a war against Ukraine but the entire West. In this sense, Ukraine is the last line of defence for Nato territory to become a target of Putin’s neo-imperialist fantasies. The tanks that will be sent are also a form of self-defence.

And the moment to send them could hardly be more favourable. Putin’s hopes of a modern “Blitzkrieg” have long since been dashed, and the modest territorial gains over the past few months show Russia’s resources are limited. The attacks on civilian infrastructure, and the implication these deliver in terms of war strategy, speak for themselves.

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But now, Ukraine will be able to form a unit that the army can use to break through Russian lines. While at the beginning of the invasion, the focus was on mobile resistance, which then shifted to strategic defence, the past week has ushered in a new phase of the war.

Suddenly, Ukraine is capable of initiating its own strategic offensive – a vital step to forestall a widely anticipated Russian spring offensive and maybe even win back Crimea, which Russia illegally annexed in 2014.

Of course, the war will ultimately still have to end at the negotiating table. However, a strong position on the battlefield will be pivotal to achieving that goal. It is a scenario that has now become more likely, albeit with perhaps irreversible damage to Germany’s reputation and Scholz’s leadership.

Thomas O. Falk is a UK-based independent journalist and political analyst who is working on a PhD with a focus on German foreign policy during the Kohl and Merkel years