No reason to think New Zealand is shifting its position on China and Aukus

New Prime Minister Chris Hipkins has left China off his travel itinerary despite calling a visit to Beijing a ‘high priority’ in January
Put in context amid the demands of domestic politics, though, this is not evidence New Zealand has sided with the US against China

Nicholas Ross Smith

Published: 12:30am, 7 May 2023

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New Zealand’s prime ministerial transition from Jacinda Ardern to Chris Hipkins, along with the possibility of a new government later this year, has raised significant debate about whether the nation’s approach to China is about to change.

The recent announcement of Hipkins’ travel schedule for the next few months has added fuel to the fire about New Zealand’s relationship with China because Beijing is a notable omission on the itinerary. This is despite Hipkins stating shortly after taking office in late January that a visit to China was a “high priority”.

Geopolitical analyst Geoffrey Miller argues that Hipkins has chosen “Brisbane over Beijing”, which signals, along with other developments, that New Zealand “increasingly follows in Australia’s foreign policy footsteps”.

New Zealand made waves earlier when defence minister Andrew Little said he was “willing to explore” participating in the second, non-nuclear pillar of the Aukus grouping. However, this and the recent travel announcement should not be taken as evidence of a clear sea change in New Zealand’s China policy – at least not yet.

First, Little’s statement on Aukus seems more about testing the waters domestically to see how New Zealanders would feel being associated, even minimally, with a pact that is centred on nuclear technology. Anti-nuclear sentiments run deep in New Zealand, and popular perception will be a significant hurdle before Wellington could commit to participating in Aukus.

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Former New Zealand PM Jacinda Ardern delivers emotional final address to parliament

Furthermore, the suggested Aukus participation is quite modest. It is more about New Zealand maintaining the minimum technological capabilities to remain militarily interoperable with Australia, its closest ally.

Second, when Hipkins’ travel schedule is contextualised, China’s omission does not seem like the glaring snub that some have claimed. His first trip abroad, last month, was to Australia, to mark 40 years of “closer economic relations” and announce a change in citizenship rules for New Zealanders living there.

The second trip was attending the coronation of King Charles on May 6, which needs no justification, given the legal and symbolic importance of the United Kingdom to New Zealand. The last trip – to the Nato summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, in early July – might appear out of place, but Ardern made the same trip last year.

Additionally, Hipkins’ travel schedule is hindered by the general election to be held on October 14. As former prime minister Helen Clark noted, Hipkins is also new to the job and needs to “hit the ground running at home”, meaning international travel has to take a back seat to domestic issues and the election.

New Zealand Prime Minister Chris Hipkins (left) and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese eat hot dogs at a barbecue after an Australian citizenship ceremony at the South Bank Piazza during Hipkins’ visit to Brisbane, Australia, on April 23. Photo: Reuters

New Zealand’s recent movements appear to be more business as usual at the moment than any indication of a major strategic change. Wellington has been following something of an “asymmetrical hedge” in its foreign policy for at least a decade – although it was most apparent after Ardern took office in 2018 – which essentially boils down to a desire for security cooperation with Australia and the US while maintaining strong trade relations with China.

Thus, New Zealand’s defence minister openly talking about Aukus participation is something one should expect in this kind of hedge as it is consistent with the nation’s security needs.

Yet, there is growing concern in Wellington about its trade dependence, with China accounting for around 30 per cent of total exports. Despite concerted efforts to offer exporters alternative markets – including freshly signed free-trade agreements with Britain and the European Union – China remains the most lucrative market, and this is unlikely to change soon.

To maintain any semblance of the status quo, New Zealand has to walk a tightrope on China. This is likely to become more perilous as China-US relations continue to deteriorate.

However, so far, New Zealand has shown adeptness in hedging, managing to maintain a mature relationship with China when most other Western countries have seen relations sour with Beijing.

Furthermore, New Zealand’s independent streak, even if it is more symbolic than anything else, remains an indelible component of its envisaged international identity. Notably, Ardern used the Nato summit last year to reiterate this point, stating that New Zealand has a “fiercely held independent foreign policy” and therefore “is not here to expand our military alliances. We are here to contribute to a world that lessens the need for anyone to call on them.”

Combine this with New Zealand’s growing embrace of te ao Maori (the Maori world view) perspectives in its foreign policymaking – especially the concept of relationality – and it seems highly likely that Wellington will seek to maintain something of a mature relationship with China as long as there is the prerequisite geopolitical wiggle room to do so.

Therefore, the absence of China in Hipkins’ travel schedule does not appear to be the harbinger of change some have prophesied. One should also not forget that foreign minister Nanaia Mahuta recently returned from an official visit to China where she met key Chinese officials Wang Yi and Qin Gang.

Ultimately, it is probable that whoever is prime minister after the next general election will make a trip to China a priority for 2024, and New Zealand will keep trying to find a constructive middle ground in the Indo-Pacific.

Nicholas Ross Smith is an adjunct fellow at the University of Canterbury, New Zealand