To understand the Quad’s real ambitions, ignore its empty rhetoric and look at its actions in the Indo-Pacific

Behind the talk about upholding the rules, maintaining a free and open region and supporting Asean centrality lies a US-led resolve to protect interests
Even the Quad’s aim to have responsibility for the Indo-Pacific is questionable – Australia is the only member that borders both oceans

Mark J. Valencia

Published: 8:15am, 14 Jun 2023

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After the rancorous China-US stand-off at the Shangri-la Dialogue in Singapore, the Quad looms ever larger in importance. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue is a loose but rapidly evolving security arrangement of Australia, India, Japan and the United States. As it looks to expand via “Quad Plus” initiatives, this is a good time to analyse its intent and direction. The Quad leaders’ statement from their fifth meeting last month provides a starting point.

In their words, the Quad intends to maintain a “free and open Indo-Pacific” and uphold “the rules-based international order”. This is code for the international system primarily built and dominated by the US and the West, and which preferentially benefits them. Quad leaders think it is increasingly under threat from a rising China and this must be deterred. They hope to do this by coordinating their strategy to constrain, contain and, if necessary, confront China.

The Quad’s agenda includes security issues like “upholding peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific maritime domain”, and “adherence to international law, particularly as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Unclos)”.

The Quad has held military exercises before and its Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness could well provide a basis for cooperation on intelligence collection targeting China’s military. But it has also deftly merged this with an agenda that includes cooperation on non-traditional security issues like climate change, disaster risk, pandemics, infrastructure, cyber and maritime safety.

This is a sop to a wary India and Japan, and to Southeast Asian sensitivities. Indeed, the Quad would have evolved more quickly towards a hardcore security arrangement but for India’s non-alignment policy and markedly different world view – seen by its refusal to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – and Japan’s constitutional constraint against deploying offensive weapons. Australia is also mindful of the sensitivities of China and Southeast Asia.

While these factors may slow the Quad’s evolution into a full-blown anti- China defence arrangement, an increasingly aggressive China may be forcing one or more wary members to change their tune. America intends for the Quad to be a deterrent – China and many countries in the region see it this way, too.

The Quad’s spin doctors seek to hide behind what it calls a “steadfast commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific that is inclusive and resilient”. But, in the US’ eyes, it doesn’t include China. US Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin told the Shangri-la Dialogue that the US is “doubling down” on regional alliances and partnerships “at every stage of defence planning”.

“Our shared goals are clear: to deter aggression and to deepen the rules and norms that promote prosperity and prevent conflict,” he said. “So, we’re stepping up planning and coordination, and training with our friends from the East China Sea to the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean.”

When the Quad leaders say they “seek a region where no country dominates and no country is dominated – one where all countries are free from coercion”, this is seen as aimed at China. But the US coerces countries militarily and economically around the world, including in the Indo-Pacific.

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Examples include its so-called freedom of navigation operations and the sanctions imposed on countries like China and top officials like Defence Minister Li Shangfu, all aimed at forcing a change in policies and actions. Amazingly, Washington wonders why Li won’t meet his US counterpart.

Even the Quad’s aim to have responsibility for the Indo-Pacific is questionable. Australia is the only genuine Indo-Pacific nation in that it borders both oceans. The US borders the Pacific Ocean and has many possessions there left over from the colonial era and World War II, but what makes it an “Indo” nation?

If it is its military base on Diego Garcia, that is quite a stretch. Many African countries border the Indian Ocean. That doesn’t make them “Pacific” countries. India is not a “Pacific” country and Japan is not an “Indo” state – unless one counts its dependence on its sea lanes for oil and gas imports. With this definition, of having a security interest in the area, many countries can claim to be “Indo-Pacific” – and some, such as Britain, Germany and France, seem inclined to do so.

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The US created this fuzzy Indo-Pacific concept and grouping by cobbling together countries at the extreme edges of the region in its strategy to surround China. This seems based on conceptual imperialism. Indeed, the key for the US is that it has security interests and military bases in the area and deploys its military there.

Quad leaders have repeatedly affirmed their “support for Asean centrality”. But the Quad, if effective, will become central to regional security management, particularly in the South China Sea.

Indeed, the US and its allies probably wanted to use Asean or some of its members as a bulwark and buffer against China but failed to secure the extent of cooperation they wished for. So they went around and over to form the Quad and the Aukus defence pact between Australia, Britain and the US. In doing so, Asean centrality in regional security affairs has been weakened.

The Quad leaders also emphasise the importance of adherence to international law and Unclos. But the US has not ratified Unclos and some of its practices and claims, as well as those of Australia, India and Japan, are contrary to its provisions.

The point is that one should not rely solely on the Quad’s pompous rhetoric but instead gauge its intent by its actions. For perceptive analysts and policymakers, reality trumps spin.

Mark J. Valencia is a non-resident senior research fellow at the Huayang Institute for Maritime Cooperation and Ocean Governance