Germany’s national security strategy is not a paradigm shift on China

Taken at face value, the strategy offers a welcome dose of reality, but the lack of specificity and the repetition of mantras suggests it heralds little change
Instead, Germany appears content to continue the Sino-German status quo while trying to appease the US with harsh criticism of China

Thomas O. Falk

Published: 12:30am, 23 Jun 2023

Why you can trust SCMP

Germany has unveiled its new national security strategy, but those who expected a fundamental paradigm shift in the country’s security architecture were disappointed as Berlin remains vague on pivotal issues. Despite some harsh rhetoric, Sino-German relations are unlikely to change significantly.

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz praised the strategy as a significant change. Driven by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the future of Sino-German relations, international pressure has mounted on Berlin to stop being reactive and become more proactive in addressing threats on the global stage.

Taken at face value, the strategy offers a welcome dose of reality. The German government openly addresses the fact that for the foreseeable future, Europe’s security will have to be defended against – and not with – Russia, while China is clearly cast as a threat to global security that warrants economic and political de-risking.

However, as is so often the case, the devil is in the detail. For example, referring to the issues of development cooperation, cybersecurity and the protection of supply chains, Scholz said the plan involved “meshing together all means and instruments to strengthen Germany’s security against external threats”. However, he did not explain exactly how Germany aims to achieve this.

Instead, it sounded more like a mere repetition of his commitments during his Zeitenwende speech in February 2022. The proclamation that Russia has become the “greatest threat to peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic region” for the foreseeable future falls under the same premise.

01:56

‘Everything that helps Ukraine’: German Defence Minister visits Leopard 2 tank brigade

It is also regrettable that the coalition parties in the government could not agree on establishing a National Security Council like that of the United States. Such a body would not only have been able to coordinate foreign and security policy decisions and assume operational control in crises, it could also have reviewed the implementation of the document. In the end, though, the Green Party-led Foreign Office feared losing influence if the council was housed under the chancellory.

Added to the repetition of mantras in the security strategy is a blatant vagueness. On the subject of Ukraine, for example, Germany promises to continue its support for “as long as it is necessary”, but there has been no word on how to ensure Ukraine’s security once a ceasefire or a peace treaty has been agreed.

Meanwhile, Taiwan, arguably the most crucial security issue of the next decade, was entirely omitted from the strategy. This is despite Berlin promising support in its coalition agreement of 2021.

The US and China in particular will have paid close attention to the strategy document. After all, how Germany and the European Union plan to maintain their relations with a rising China while tensions between Beijing and Washington – the EU’s most crucial ally – continue to deteriorate is a pressing question.

US President Joe Biden (left) and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz at the G7 summit in Hiroshima, Japan, on May 20. Photo: AP

Some US interests differ significantly from those of the EU and Germany. Even under President Joe Biden, the US has continued pursuing a rather “America first” line towards Europe, with the Inflation Reduction Act being just one example.

The US has called China its “most consequential geopolitical challenge” and has been trying to nudge Europeans towards this position to form a “united front” against Beijing. Yet, Germany’s security document avoids taking that stance. Instead, while sharply criticising it for its practices, China is described as a “partner, competitor and systemic rival” – wording similar to that of the 2021 coalition agreement.

The new national security strategy states, “China is trying in various ways to reshape the existing rules-based international order, is increasingly aggressively claiming regional supremacy, and is repeatedly acting in contradiction to our interests and values.” But what might be read as a paradigm shift towards China is merely a summary of Scholz and Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock’s critique of Beijing ever since taking office.

01:29

In Beijing, German FM warns escalation on Taiwan could be ‘worst-case scenario’ for global economy

While Germany has yet to publish a separate China strategy document, the lack of clarity shows two things in particular. First, Berlin understands that de-risking is OK but that decoupling would be a grave mistake. Such a step would be associated with significantly higher costs, given that China remains Germany’s biggest trading partner. Berlin is acutely aware that no other market could come close to compensating German businesses in a decoupling scenario.

Second, the document shows that Germany is trying to find a way to free itself from having to make a binary choice between the US and the economic benefits of relations with China. With the 2024 US presidential election looming, this is more important than ever.

Germany and China’s 50-year relationship takes a disappointing turn

Democrats and Republicans are likely to compete on which party is more hawkish towards China. The potential return of former president Donald Trump, who could choose to abandon Europe for an isolationist approach once again, suggests that unconditionally siding with Washington against China could potentially be a recipe for disaster.

As sensible as Germany’s stance on China seems at this stage, the strategy largely ignores questions of its own implementation, and it seems unrealistic that Berlin can achieve the goal of a security policy from a single source without a National Security Council. Germany’s national security strategy thus leaves much to be desired in a geopolitical leadership sense.

It now seems apparent, however, that Berlin has made the conscious decision to continue the Sino-German status quo and try to chew gum and walk at the same time. It hopes not to get entangled in the US-China stand-off, to continue to harvest the benefits of a fruitful economic relationship with China and to make gestures towards appeasing Washington with stark criticism of Beijing.

Thomas O. Falk is a UK-based independent journalist and political analyst