Little hope of progress on US-China military talks when two sides remain so far apart

Even with better communications between their respective militaries, the trust gap between Beijing and Washington is unlikely to improve
US calls for military transparency might sound reasonable, but they favour the more powerful nation and come from a side failing to practise what it preaches

Mark J. Valencia

Published: 8:15am, 1 Aug 2023

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The main purpose of US Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s recent visit to China was, in his words, to help reduce “misunderstandings and miscommunications” so as to prevent incidents between the two sides. He was unsuccessful in restarting military-to-military talks, though, and it seems that just agreeing to talk has become politicised while the communications process is being used to the advantage of one side or the other.

The level of US-China military communications is at a nadir, and incidents between their militaries are increasing in frequency and intensity. As these incidents proliferate, a growing chorus of policymakers and analysts is calling for better communication before things get out of control.

Tensions remain high. There was a near-collision in the Taiwan Strait on June 3 when a Chinese warship abruptly cut across the bow of a US warship. That incident came after a May 31 incident when a Chinese fighter jet forced a US reconnaissance place in international airspace to fly through its wake turbulence. US defence officials have described these incidents as part of a pattern of more aggressive behaviour by China.

The US wants to reestablish communications to help tamp down the possibility of conflict, but China is not cooperating. As pointed out by Yun Sun, a senior fellow and co-director of the East Asia Programme and director of the China Programme at the Stimson Centre, its position on restarting military dialogue might be part of a strategy that encompasses the communication process.

At the very least, it seems to have been captured by their fundamental differences. With the heavy US interest in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and other hotspots around the globe, Beijing might think Washington is more averse to conflict than it is. That means China thinks it has more diplomatic space to manoeuvre and could also think that agreeing to communicate will undermine its tactic of brinkmanship.

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Moreover, China might want to keep the US guessing as to its intent and red lines, whose crossing may trigger military conflict. At the most extreme, China might even believe that a crisis would provide an opportunity to extract concessions from the US and negotiate a regime of peaceful coexistence.

China might also think the process of military communication favours the US because it can point to it as its good-faith effort and have more freedom of action while negotiations continue. Given this, China might want to slow progress on military-to-military communications.

Realpolitik is influencing the efforts at talks. China wants the US to demonstrate good faith with its actions, not just its words. It seems that every opportunity for meaningful talks is preceded, followed or even accompanied by aggressive or negative action on both sides.

The close-in intelligence-gathering and freedom of navigation operations continue unabated. The US says it follows the “one China” policy at the same time that it sends arms and high-level politicians to Taiwan. Beijing wants the US to eliminate its close-in intelligence gathering as well as the naval operations it carries out near China’s maritime claims.

Most importantly, Beijing wants the US to end its political and military support for Taiwan. It has accused Washington of undermining the diplomatic agreements that form the basis for relations between the two sides. It is difficult to envision any productive dialogue emerging until China’s conditions are met. Otherwise, mutual suspicion will prevail.

Even with better communications between their respective militaries, the trust gap between China and the US is unlikely to improve and dangerous incidents are still likely. This is because they do not stem from misunderstandings and miscommunications but are rooted in deeper differences about the international order and strategic interests. As such, the best outcome of talks would be to manage these incidents when they occur.

The two sides have stated their fundamental policies regarding their relationship. President Xi Jinping has proffered “three noes”: China “does not seek to change the existing international order or interfere in the internal affairs of the United States and has no intention to challenge or displace the United States”.

Meanwhile, US President Joe Biden has offered what Chinese reports have called “five noes”. According to these, the US does not seek a new Cold War or to change China’s system, the revitalisation of its alliances is not directed at China, it is not looking for conflict with China, and it does not support Taiwanese independence. So far, though, US actions do not seem to match these words.

President Xi Jinping and US President Joe Biden shake hands before their meeting on the sidelines of the Group of 20 summit on November 14, 2022, in Bali, Indonesia. Photo: AP

Xi has proposed “a new model of great-power relations” that implies equality and shared responsibility in world affairs. But, so far, it seems that the US has rejected this notion, and expecting that to change soon is unrealistic.

This communications conundrum is a corollary to the concept of mutual transparency in military affairs. While transparency in military affairs might sound neutral and reasonable, it favours the more powerful nation. That nation can intimidate the other by revealing its capabilities while the inferior military power displays its weaknesses that can be exploited by the more powerful side.

Besides, the notion of transparency is ambiguous. The US says it is transparent, but try to ask questions about the position and role of its nuclear-armed submarines or its specific intelligence collection capabilities in the South China Sea.

Until the “noes” on either side begin to ring true, there will be little progress on meaningful military -to-military communications and tension will remain high in the South China Sea.

Mark J. Valencia is a non-resident senior research fellow at the Huayang Institute for Maritime Cooperation and Ocean Governance