South China Sea: expect more close calls, high tension in 2023 amid military build-up
Between the dynamics of the fraught US-China rivalry and competition for resources between China and Southeast Asian states, there is much that could go wrong
The lack of any binding framework and parties frequently ignoring existing rules offer little hope for anything other than more near misses and stand-offs
The political-military situation in the South China Sea is a dangerous one that fosters incidents when and where the security interests and actions of the main protagonists clash. The recent “near miss” between a Chinese fighter jet and a US military plane was no one-off. The outlook for 2023 is for more of the same, although incidents could vary in severity and escalation with the tenor of the relations between parties.
China is rapidly enhancing its ability to project power in the South China Sea and beyond. Meanwhile, the United States is entering “the most transformative year in US force projection in the region in a generation”.
When the continuing contest over Taiwan and US freedom of navigation operations challenging China’s claims in the South China Sea are added to the mix, it becomes apparent that many things could go wrong. And that is just the US-China dynamic. There is also the competition for resources between China and its rival Southeast Asian claimants.
The overall political environment is driven by the US-China contest for dominance of the region and in particular the South China Sea, where their strategic trajectories converge. China is developing what is known as an “anti-access/area denial strategy” designed to control its near seas and prevent access by the US in the event of a conflict.
The US response is to build the capacity to hamper China’s command, control, communications, computer and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems (ISR). Thus, ISR is the tip of the spear for both, and both are trying to dominate it over, on and under China’s near seas.
Of particular importance to Beijing, the South China Sea provides relative sanctuary for its retaliatory strike nuclear submarines based in Yulin on Hainan. The US wants to deny China this sanctuary and uses its ISR probes to detect, track and, if necessary, target the subs.
01:46
Chinese fighter jet almost collides with US military plane over South China Sea
Chinese fighter jet almost collides with US military plane over South China Sea
This is the strategic calculus behind the US’ ISR probes and China’s attempt to keep them as far away from its military assets as possible. Some probes involve Australian ISR assets and may soon be joined by those of Japan. Incidents arise when, in China’s view, the probes get too close to military secrets. As this strategic contest heats up, these incidents are likely to increase in frequency and severity.
US assets in partner countries are also likely to increase and draw them deeper into the fray. Prime among them is the Philippines. Manila wants the threat of US backup in response to China’s aggressive actions in the South China Sea.
But, in exchange for its protection, Washington wants to position its military assets in the Philippines. Implementing the US-Philippines Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement – now being considered by President Ferdinand Marcos Jnr – would allow this. China might retaliate by stepping up its aggressive moves against the Philippines in the South China Sea.
Also, the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia are moving ahead with resource exploration and exploitation in areas that China claims. An international arbitration panel has ruled that China’s nine-dash line claim is illegal, but Beijing still challenges these activities. Meanwhile, the US is waiting in the wings.
01:22
Philippines reports incident of close ‘manoeuvring’ by China coastguard ship near Scarborough Shoal
Philippines reports incident of close ‘manoeuvring’ by China coastguard ship near Scarborough Shoal
A moment of truth could be approaching for the Philippines. Marcos Jnr’s administration is considering allowing Forum Energy to proceed with petroleum exploration on the Reed Bank. The company has asked the government for protection against harassment by China. If provided, it could lead to military confrontation, which could draw in the Philippines’ military ally, the US.
Indonesia is also gearing up to exploit resources in the Tuna Block offshore gas field that China also claims. In late 2021, China ordered Indonesia to cease drilling there. Chinese vessels harassed an Indonesian-sanctioned drilling rig and continue to patrol the area. Now, Indonesia has approved the first phase of the field’s development.
The operator’s chairman said “the Indonesian navy will also participate in securing the upstream oil and gas project so that economically and politically, it becomes an affirmation of Indonesia’s sovereignty”. Demonstrating its political will, Jakarta is strengthening its military cooperation with the US. It has also transferred a major naval fleet closer to the area and plans to spend US$125 billion on new weapons.
Even Malaysia – which has been reluctant to confront China – could be involved in incidents in 2023. In April 2020, when a Chinese vessel harassed a Malaysia-sanctioned drilling rig in the West Capella field, the US and Australia sent warships to back up Malaysia.
Although Malaysia was uneasy about this approach, it reacted strongly to an April 2021 flight of Chinese warplanes near Sarawak, scrambling jets and filing a formal protest. Afterwards, the US declared its support for Malaysia.
Some hope that a robust code of conduct will be concluded soon to help ease tensions and reduce incidents. However, sharp disagreements remain over critical issues such as the code’s geographic scope, legal status, enforcement mechanisms and the role of outside powers, and these are unlikely to be resolved soon, if ever.
The status quo is guided by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the non-binding Declaration on Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea, both of which are frequently violated by most actors.
This year will be another one of near-misses and breathless moments which make up the new normal. It is crucial that the main actors prepare to prevent the inevitable incidents from escalating into wider and deeper clashes.
Mark J. Valencia is a non-resident senior research fellow at the Huayang Institute for Maritime Cooperation and Ocean Governance
