As the Trump administration enters what might be its final year in office, the spiralling crisis with Iran underscores the consequences of the lack of effective bureaucratic guardrails on the president’s impulses.

Until Donald Trump’s presidency, scholars of international relations might have been sceptical that such a thing as “diversionary” war can really exist, but Trump has apparently shown this not to be the case.

After becoming the third-ever president to be impeached in the House of Representatives, Trump has now thrown a lit match on the US-Iran relations tinderbox.

Iran admits it ‘unintentionally’ shot down Ukrainian plane, after days of denial

According to US political reporting, the president had apparently also told his associates that he hoped the strike on Soleimani would help his impending impeachment trial in the Senate, apparently seeking to win favour with senators who are hawkish on Iran.

The current round of nonsensical escalation with Iran is deeply counterproductive to broader US interests and even goes against many of this administration’s stated global priorities.

It is no surprise that Trump gives little heed to his own administration’s strategic documents, all of which he has likely never read or even perhaps heard of, but the first days of 2020 underscore that if “great power competition” is meant to be this administration’s strategic mantra, it is not guiding Trump’s decision-making in any real way.

For China, the prospect of a new American quagmire in the Middle East by way of a potential war in Iran presents both a troubling prospect and an intriguing opportunity.

Beijing’s most apparent interests – including stability in hydrocarbon prices and supply from the Gulf – would be negatively affected by a war, of course.

US tried and failed to kill second Iranian leader on day of Qassem Soleimani drone strike

But over the longer term, a US-Iran conflict would be devastating to the United States’ ability to sustain power projection in the Asia-Pacific theatre. It would also put an end to the US Department of Defence’s exhortation in last year’s Indo-Pacific Strategy Report that the Asian region was the Trump administration’s “priority theatre”.

The current US-Iran crisis might also give Beijing an opportunity to step up its appearance of global leadership. Traditionally, China has kept a low profile internationally during major crises, but increasingly, Beijing is speaking out – often by partnering with Russia over shared interests.

For instance, after the US embassy in Baghdad was besieged by Kataib Hezbollah supporters in the final days of 2019, the Chinese and Russian permanent representatives at the United Nations were unwilling to assent to a US statement condemning the siege. Beijing and Moscow saw the statement as excluding US culpability for the Soleimani strike.

Depending on how the crisis may evolve, Beijing might find itself forced to take on greater responsibility. China’s relationship with Iran is complex, but Beijing hardly sees Tehran’s ability to act on its own preferences in the Middle East as relevant to its interests.

Will China try to solve the US-Iran crisis – or view it as an opportunity?

But allowing the United States to distract itself with yet another misadventure in the Middle East may prove tempting.

Following Iran’s missile strikes, the United States has not chosen to respond for now. If good sense and reason somehow prevail against all odds, then the crisis might end here and Washington and Tehran might somehow find a way to not only de-escalate, but to perhaps even begin to address their differences on either side of a negotiating table.

Ankit Panda is a senior editor at The Diplomat